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Abstract
Through their current policy on data sharing, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are inadvertently placing a
serious and potentially insuperable burden upon non-US researchers who perform patient-based genomics studies
in collaboration with US institutions. Because this policy could adversely affect future transnational scientific
collaborations, we explore some of its likely consequences and suggest possible courses of remedial action
wherever feasible.
The NIH policy for sharing GWAS data
In January 2008, the US National Institutes of Health
(NIH) put into effect their Policy for Sharing of Data
Obtained in NIH Supported or Conducted Genome-Wide
Association Studies (GWAS) (NOT-OD-07-088) [1]. The
self-declared goal of this policy was ‘to advance science
for the benefit of the public through the creation of a
centralized NIH GWAS data repository’ (NOT-OD-07-
088) [1]. The policy, which was revised and expanded in
O c t o b e r2 0 0 9s oa st oi n c l u d eD N As e q u e n c ed a t a
(NOT-HG-10-006) [2], was inspired by the view
espoused by the NIH ‘that the full value of GWAS to
the public can be realized only if the genotype and phe-
notype datasets are made available as rapidly as possible
to a wide range of scientific investigators’ (NOT-OD-07-
088) [1]. Irrespective of whether this view is justified
(for example, on the basis of previous experience or per-
suasive scientific evidence), its implementation in the
context of public funding practice may well place a ser-
ious burden upon researchers performing GWAS or
large-scale sequencing studies. This would appear to be
particularly true with regard to those researchers who
initiated and conducted their research projects outside
of the NIH sphere of influence, and who have only lat-
terly come under its aegis by virtue of their being
involved in collaborations with at least one NIH-funded
partner. Although the NIH initiated a public consulta-
tion process in 2006, no representations were taken
from non-US sources, as far as we can see. This was a
serious omission, because the lack of any centralized
health service provider in the USA implies that US
researchers might in time have to become at least par-
tially dependent upon well-characterized patient cohorts
from other countries.
The situation with non-NIH funded data
The major drawback of the current NIH policy is the
mandatory requirement to place all genome-wide geno-
typing/nucleic acid sequence data (plus all relevant
phenotypic information) from NIH-funded and NIH-
supported studies into the NIH’so w nr e p o s i t o r y ,t h e
Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP) [3]. In
this respect, the NIH is very clear about their position,
stating in the Implementation Guidance and Instructions
for Applicants for GWAS (NOT-OD-08-013) [4] that
‘applications and proposals that include GWAS, regard-
less of the requested costs, are expected to include as
part of the Research Plan either a plan for submission of
GWAS data to the NIH-designated GWAS data reposi-
tory, or an appropriate explanation for why submission
to the repository will not be possible’. What explanation
the NIH would regard as ‘appropriate’ here unfortu-
nately remains unclear. This notwithstanding, we know
from personal experience that the above requirement
extends far beyond NIH-funded activities in the narrow
sense so as to include non-NIH funded data from NIH-
supported collaborative GWAS, irrespective of the pro-
portion of funding actually provided by the NIH. The
obligation to submit data to dbGaP applies equally well
to situations in which only one component group is
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Some points of (constructive) criticism
In view of this overt interventionism with regard to aca-
demic working relationships, it seems worthwhile to
explore some of the aspects of the NIH policy that
could adversely (albeit wholly unintentionally) affect
international collaborative efforts in patient-based geno-
mics research. The NIH states that it ‘will revisit and
revise the policy and related practices as appropriate’
(NOT-OD-07-088) [1]. We interpret this statement as
an invitation to comment, in the spirit of constructive
criticism, and to evaluate whether the NIH policy as
currently formulated has unforeseen and/or unintended
consequences for researchers. The following represents
a list of difficulties potentially posed by this policy.
1. Without proper prior consent by their sample
donors, no research institution would be in a posi-
tion to submit individual-level genetic data to a pub-
licly accessible database such as dbGaP. Because the
scope of genomics research is inherently wide, and
indeed often poorly defined at the outset, many
research groups may well have been sufficiently
prescient to have obtained broad consent from their
donors, covering the possibility of transfer to third
parties and the use of samples and data for general
genetics research. However, unless the placing of
data into international databases has been explicitly
stated as an option in the information provided to
donors at the outset, it cannot be assumed to have
been automatically built into the study. Even though
the NIH appears to have recognized this potential
quandary by stating that they ‘may give programma-
tic consideration to requests for funds or other
resources needed to conduct additional participant
consent when appropriate’ (NOT-OD-07-088) [1],
obtaining retrospective consent from a large GWAS
cohort is likely to be difficult, if not wholly impracti-
cal, both in terms of the logistics required and the
possible donor responses.
2. In August 2008, the NIH were obliged to change
the access governance to dbGaP in response to a
number of studies that convincingly demonstrated
that individual genome-wide genotyping profiles
could be identified even in aggregate datasets [5,6].
At first glance, the potential to re-identify individual
anonymized contributors to a collection of single-
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) allele frequencies
appeared to be implausible, even counterintuitive.
Indeed, the marker-wise aggregation of genotypes in
dbGaP into mere allele counts was initially regarded
by the NIH as a sufficient means of anonymization.
However, for each and every SNP, the minor and
major allele frequencies in an aggregated dataset are
necessarily shifted, almost imperceptibly but never-
theless consistently, towards the alleles of any target
individual included in the dataset compared with a
reference population not including that individual
[5]. Although this would not be a problem in terms
of re-identification when a hundred or even a thou-
sand markers were involved [7], the combination of
these biases over the hundreds of thousands of SNPs
usually employed in a GWAS generates an effect
that is very likely to become significant upon formal
statistical testing, thereby rendering the individual in
question potentially identifiable. Once this was rea-
lised, unrestricted access to the aggregated genotype
data in dbGaP was promptly and appropriately aban-
doned, and all data were moved to a controlled area
of the database. In the context of the present discus-
sion, however, because these developments were
pretty much unforeseeable even to genetics experts,
the extent to which a lay person’s consent to the
inclusion of genetic data into a widely accessible
database can be genuinely ‘informed’ seems to us
scarcely tenable.
3. Despite the abandonment of unrestricted access to
dbGaP, all aggregate and individual-level data in the
NIH repository remain extremely sensitive, because
of the inherent self-identifying property of genome-
wide genotypes. Thus, a comparison between dbGaP
and a reference genetic profile, generated for as few
as 30 to 80 SNPs, would in practice allow the re-
identification of any contributor [8], including
restoration of linkage with phenotype data included
in the database. As long as this identifiability pro-
blem remains unresolved, the sufficiency of the data-
protection measures implemented by dbGaP will
remain difficult to evaluate. It must not be forgotten
that many, if not most, scientific collaborations
involve partners with longstanding working relation-
ships. Any violation of reciprocal agreements relating
to the protection of shared data could result in a
loss of trust between these partners. Such an out-
come is likely to be a much greater deterrent to vio-
lation of privacy-protection requirements than the
prospect of the imposition of unspecified sanctions
by an anonymous database governance body.
4. At first glance, ‘open consent’, as promulgated for
example by the Personal Genomes Project, may be
one way around the identifiability problem [9]. If
privacy were no longer to be promised to study par-
ticipants, then there would clearly be no risk of
breaking such a promise. However, widespread
adoption of open consent in human genetics
research may well be a slippery slope that would
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informed consent in medical research. In a way,
‘open consent’ and ‘informed consent’ may even be
regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives, because
the act of a person giving their open consent implies
the renunciation of any right to full information
relating to the subsequent use of their sample(s) and
associated data. Further, open consent may not only
limit the group of potential participants in a given
research project, but could also bias the results
obtained.
5. During the consent process, the primary recipient
of a sample or data item must be clearly recogniz-
able by the sample or data donor. Otherwise, their
consent cannot be assumed to be truly informed.
Often, the donor’s motivation to participate in a
research project may be influenced by their tacit
approval of, or long-term relationship with, a parti-
cular individual or a specific institution responsible
for the project and potentially benefiting from it. If
all genotype data are indeed destined to end up in a
US-based international database under American
curatorship, then all sample donors ought to be
explicitly informed of this arrangement from the
outset.
6. One of the key mechanisms by which the primary
recipients of samples and data can ensure that the
donor’s consent is respected in collaborative research
projects is by entering into bilateral, legally binding
agreements with their project partner [10]. It is at
best unclear to what extent non-US researchers
would be willing (and indeed entitled) to delegate
this responsibility to an anonymous Data Access
Committee (DAC) under the auspices of the US
authorities. In fact, neither NOT-OD-07-088 [1] nor
NOT-HG-10-006 [2] makes any mention of transna-
tional collaborations in which some of the participat-
ing institutions are legally bound by data-protection
rules other than those of the USA. It is worth men-
tioning in this context that Article 25 of the EU
Directive on Data Protection (95/46/EC) [11]
requires that the transfer of personal data to a coun-
try outside the EU ‘may take place only if [...] the
country in question ensures an adequate level of
protection’.A sy e t ,t h eE Uh a sn o tr e c o g n i z e dt h e
USA as belonging to the latter category of countries,
largely because a regulatory framework comparable
with the many national implementations of Directive
95/46/EC in the EU simply does not exist in the
USA.
7 .I ft h ed e c i s i o no v e rw h om a yo rm a yn o tu s ea
given set of GWAS data for whatever purpose is
delegated exclusively to US authorities, this would to
all intents and purposes undermine the authority of
national governance bodies such as, for example, the
UK’s Human Genetics Commission [12], and local
or regional ethics committees. Furthermore,
although the NIH claims that their ‘DACs will
approve access only for research uses that are con-
sistent with an individual’s consent as defined by the
submitting institution’ (NOT-OD-07-088) [1], many
requests to dbGaP can be expected to retain a cer-
tain amount of interpretational ‘wiggle room’ in this
respect.
8. The actual scientific benefits to be derived from
the free sharing of genetic research data are still
unclear, and may eventually turn out to be negligi-
ble. The NIH confidently states that ‘the potential
for public benefit to be achieved through sharing
GWAS data are significant’ (NOT-OD-07-088) [1],
yet they provide no concrete examples of such bene-
fits, either actual or hypothetical. This notwithstand-
ing, there are a number of methodological issues
that actually place a serious question mark over the
general utility of broad GWAS data sharing. Thus,
ever-larger patient sample sizes may not automati-
cally facilitate the reliable detection of ever smaller
genetic effect sizes. Further, the hastily conceived
combining of primary data from different sources
could lead to ascertainment bias and population
genetic differences that, if not taken into account at
t h ed a t aa n a l y s i ss t a g e ,m ight actually increase the
likelihood of false-positive results. Finally, because
there are no generally agreed standards for the qual-
ity control of genotype or nucleotide sequence data,
data heterogeneity may also become a serious pro-
blem that could only be alleviated if large amounts
of accompanying technical information were also to
be included in the data repository. Even then, how-
ever, the appropriate scientific use of this informa-
tion would require methodological expertise that
cannot be assumed to be available to the average
user.
9. Without structured access to GWAS or nucleotide
sequence data, meta-analyses of such data would
also run the risk of becoming a problematic exercise,
because the traditional commitment of primary data
providers to certain collaborative consortia would no
longer exist. Further, if the combined analysis of
multiple data sets becomes feasible at the click of a
mouse, it will become increasingly difficult for jour-
nal editors and peer reviewers to judge the scientific
credibility of such efforts and to prioritize the publi-
cation of the results appropriately.
10. In addition to running the risk of impinging
upon the basic tenets of academic freedom, a cen-
trally imposed and rigidly enforced limit to the
exclusive right of data exploitation by the primary
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unjustified. In practical terms, the bottleneck in
potentiating high-quality genetic epidemiological
research is the recruitment and phenotyping of
donors, not the generation of genotype data. This
means that the major investment into a GWAS has
often been made well before the genotype data
become available, and by researchers who are not
necessarily in a position to be able to exploit their
data as rapidly as their US counterparts. In
NOT-HG-10-006 [2], the NIH ‘acknowledges the
importance of recognizing the valuable and unique
contributions made by the scientists who have col-
lected the biological samples and associated pheno-
type information’, yet nowhere is it made clear what
form this recognition should take. For the original
recipient of data and samples to benefit adequately
from their work, a maximum embargo period of
12 months (as stipulated by the NIH) may simply be
too short. It is difficult to understand why the NIH
is unwilling to leave the decision as to when data are
‘r e a d yt og op u b l i c ’ to the primary data providers
themselves. It should be appreciated that unless
there are very good reasons to the contrary, most
genetic researchers working on a particular disease
would normally be highly motivated to have their
GWAS results replicated or otherwise improved by
additional analyses, and hence may want to initiate
the necessary collaborations themselves.
Conclusions
The above considerations are not in any way intended
to call into question the core motivation of the NIH
policy, namely that ‘maximizing the availability of
resources facilitates research and enables medical
science to better address the health needs of people
based on their individual genetic information’ (NOT-
OD-07-088) [1]. On the contrary, any endeavour that
helps to promote collaborative efforts in the field of
patient-based genetics research is to be welcomed. In
our view, however, the emphasis should be placed firmly
on building a quality central resource to which the
international scientific community would be glad to
contribute data. In our own experience, scientists
respond best to a variety of different forms of incentives
rather than to edict or diktat. Given a relaxed regimen
relating to data deposition, it is likely that researchers
worldwide would opt to contribute their own GWAS
and nucleotide sequence data to the NIH data deposi-
tory on a voluntary basis, even if their work had not
itself been NIH-funded. Conversely, the imposition of
overly restrictive rules relating to data deposition could
easily discourage non-US-based researchers from colla-
borating with NIH-funded groups, surely not the origi-
nal aim of this well-intentioned yet still misguided NIH
policy.
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